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[Thurgood Marshall] helped persuade us that the vogue for positivism in
jurisprudence - the obsession with what the law is, which leaves no room for
a choice between equally acceptable alternatives - must be replaced by a juris-
prudence that recognizes human beings as the most distinctive and important
feature of the universe which confronts our senses, and that recognizes the func-
tion of law as the historic means of guaranteeing that preeminence.'
We take the occasion of Thurgood Marshall's retirement from
the Supreme Court, and from public life, to reflect on his career
and accomplishments. We do so to pay tribute to this champion of
the rights of minorities, the poor, and others disadvantaged and to
express our appreciation for his tireless efforts that have enhanced
opportunities and improved the quality of life for so many Amer-
icans. In addition, reflection on Marshall's career provides a sorely
needed model for public interest-minded law students and lawyers.
The record of his service is well known: civil rights lawyer, di-
rector-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, federal court of
appeals judge, Solicitor General of the United States, and twenty-
four years as Supreme Court Justice. Throughout that progression,
he achieved many "firsts" for an Afro-American, including the first
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, B.A. Wesleyan University,
1971; J.D. Vanderbilt School of Law, 1974; LL.M. Temple School of Law, 1978.
** Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, A.B. An-
derson College, 1962; J.D. Indiana University at Bloomington School of Law, 1965; LL.M. Harvard,
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1. Justice William Brennan Address at the Dedication of the Thurgood Marshall Library,
University of Maryland (Oct. 9, 1980).
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of his race to serve in either of the latter two posts. Although his
long tenure on the Court enabled him to participate in many land-
mark decisions, Marshall's greatest contributions came from his work
as an advocate for the NAACP advancing civil rights causes.
Unable because of his race to attend the University of Maryland
Law School in his hometown of Baltimore, Marshall enrolled at,
and graduated first in his class from, the Howard University Law
School. He returned to Baltimore after graduation and was soon
thrust into litigation on behalf of the NAACP. He eventually became
a staff attorney and litigated a series of victories to equalize salaries
paid to black and white teachers in the South.2 In 1938, he became
special counsel to the association, a position that shortly evolved
into director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. In
that capacity, he engineered a nationwide strategy to vindicate the
civil rights of Afro-Americans and bring down the "Jim Crow"
regimes then in place. His most significant victories, at least prior
to 1954, invalidated the "white primaries," which were effectively
disenfranchising blacks in the South; 3 required admission of Afro-
Americans to the previously segregated University of Texas Law
School;4 and ended the use of racially restrictive covenants in res-
idential home sales.' He then orchestrated the strategy and the lit-
igation that led to the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education6 which, of course, declared unconstitutional the state-
sponsored segregation of public schools.
The importance of his NAACP work cannot be exaggerated.
Through his leadership, the Association dismantled a governmentally
imposed system that ensured the subordination of an entire race in
major portions of this country. Down-to-earth, garrulous, and char-
ismatic, he maneuvered the often discordant elements within the civil
rights forces. He handled staff, client groups (who were typically
very poor and uneducated), opposing lawyers, and judges with vir-
2. E.g., Alston v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940).
3. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
4. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
5. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
[Vol. 94
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tuosity. "He played the role of conductor beautifully,'"7 said the
sociologist Kenneth Clark, who worked with the NAACP in the
desegregation cases. Always exercising common sense, Marshall
carefully calculated his opportunities and seized upon them when
he was confident of success. He was, according to one commentator,
a "blend of militant radical-idealist and wily pragmatist." 8 Through
it all, he maintained an ever-ready sense of humor as well as a
genuine caring for the people he served. "He had a terribly deep
and real affection for the little people, the people he called the Little
Joes," said a lawyer with whom he worked in the late forties, "and
the affection was returned. I never saw him put a little person
down.... He had this enormous ability to relate. He was not only
of them he was with them." 9 Randall Kennedy, formerly Marshall's
clerk and now a Harvard law professor, has described his parents'
tales of "how [black southerners] back in Jim Crow days would say
things like, 'Hold on, Thurgood's coming.' He was sort of a mes-
sianic figure."10
He was also relentless and indefatigable, traveling throughout
the country to deal with the spectrum of legal and organizational
problems affecting Afro-Americans in the forties and fifties. He
logged 50,000 miles a year, most of it in the South where his comfort
and accommodations were severely strained by "whites only" signs.
He darted about not only to address the inequities of segregation
laws, but also to defend blacks accused of notorious crimes and
facing hostile communities, combat local government or police abuses
of Afro-Americans, and rally the troops in the far-flung NAACP
branches. Marshall even squeezed between proceedings in the South
Carolina desegregation case a six week trip to Korea to investigate
complaints from black soldiers stationed there of mistreatment by
the military.
Determination and courage marked his work with the NAACP.
Indeed, he could not have continued without both. The hostility of
7. KLUGER, supra note 6, at 404.
8. Id. at 409.
9. Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
10. Quoted in Fred Strasser, Recalling a Champion of Rights, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1991, at 30.
1991]
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the law, of local judges, and sometimes even of federal appellate
courts, as well as recurring setbacks and the retarded pace of of-
ficialdom to confront the country's race problem, all required ex-
traordinary perseverance from those who dared to force reforms. It
took no small amount of courage to appear in remote courtrooms,
often times as the first black lawyer that locals had ever seen, and
to present arguments that threatened to shake the foundations of
Southern life. Marshall had to deal, too, with real threats of physical
violence. On one occasion, he was driving from a rural Tennessee
town, where he was representing black defendants accused of assault
to commit murder, when a small army of law officials stopped to
check his car for possession of liquor. (It was a dry county). After
their search produced nothing, they released him, but soon stopped
him again. This time, they examined his driver's license, and again,
they let him go. On a third stop, they arrested him for drunk driving.
Upon driving him back to town for a hearing, the patrol car carrying
him pulled off on a side road, but returned to the highway when
it was followed by some of Marshall's compatriots. After the local
magistrate detected no evidence of alcohol and Marshall was re-
leased, he and his fellow travelers switched cars with a local person.
When Marshall's original car was driven off in a different direction,
the police stopped it again and beat the driver." On another oc-
casion, following a hearing in the South Carolina desegregation case,
a local man warned Marshall, "If you show your black ass in Clar-
endon County ever again, you're a dead man.' ' 2
Besides his other qualities, Marshall was a damn good lawyer.
As an advocate, he was fervent, quick on his feet, yet always in
command of his emotions and the situation. He argued thirty-two
cases before the Supreme Court, winning twenty-nine of them. Al-
l1. The incident is described in KLUGER, supra note 6, at 281-82.
12. Id. at 676. Kluger cites other examples in which Marshall faced the threat of physical abuse.
Id. at 280-81, 710. Kluger also reports an incident, perhaps true, in which Marshall showed that his
courage was edged by his pragmatism. Marshall himself told the story of a stop he made at a small
Mississippi town contemplating an overnight stay. He recounted that he was standing on the train
platform when a "cold-eyed man with a gun on his hip comes up. 'Nigguh,' he said, 'I thought you
oughta know the sun ain't nevah set on a live nigguh in this town.' So I wrapped my constitutional
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ways prepared and forceful, he was by all accounts at his best in
the arguments in Brown, perhaps the most significant case decided
by any court in this century.
His accomplishments as a lawyer came at a personal sacrifice,
as well. Not only did his work deny him the pace and relaxation
of a normal law practice and keep him from home and family much
of the year, but it also failed to pay him very well. The Legal De-
fense Fund during Marshall's years always operated on a shoestring.
In 1951, for example, after thirteen years as the Fund's chief lawyer
and in payment for yeoman services, his salary stood at $8,748.30.13
As indicated by financial statements filed by federal judges, Marshall
never did accumulate much in the way of assets, and his wealth was
always well below that of his brethern on the Supreme Court. Thus,
commitment, dedication, and sacrifice characterized Thurgood Mar-
shall's career at the bar.
His tenure on the bench was marked by an ever-increasing sense
of duty to file dissenting opinions. Appointed to the Supreme Court
by President Johnson in 1967, Marshall fell comfortably into the
liberal majority on the Warren Court. But the Court's conservative
swing, which began in 1970 and accelerated in recent years, fre-
quently left Marshall on the short end of the vote. His role during
most of his Court years, then, was quite different from the lead-
ership position he held with the NAACP and as Solicitor General.
Rather, he functioned as a conscience for the Court, as a source of
experience and perspective that lay beyond the world inhabited by
the other justices. Marshall's opinions repeatedly took up the causes
of the little people, examining how the Court's doctrines affected
the poor, minorities, and women in ways subtle as well as direct.
For example, in United States v. Kras,14 Justice Marshall chastised
the insensitivity of the majority's rationale for deciding that destitute
individuals could be denied access to bankruptcy court if they could
not afford the filing fee. According to the majority, the fee, when
paid over several months, would cost petitioners per week "less than
13. Id. at 408.
14. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
1991]
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the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two
of cigarettes." 5 Marshall responded:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2
are no burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor people can fail
to understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are.... A pack
or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a routine purchase but a luxury in-
dulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which
the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They have more im-
portant things to do with what little money they have like attempting to provide
some comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras must do.
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution
requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be prem-
ised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live. 6
Similarly, Marshall's votes and opinions on abortion evidenced a
genuine concern for the opportunities of women and, in particular,
for the adverse impact that anti-abortion laws have on minorities
and the poor. 1
7
Marshall brought his experience to bear on other issues. Having
lived and observed pervasive and severe discrimination against Afro-
Americans over six decades, he clearly spoke with authority when
he dissented from the Court's invalidation of an affirmative action
program in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 8 After
canvassing this country's mistreatment of its blacks, Marshall sum-
marized his position, speaking with the same clarity and common
sense that distinguished his work as an NAACP advocate:
[I]t is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based
discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based
remedy for that discrimination is permissible .... [Today's judgment ignores the
fact that for several hundred years Negroes have been discriminated against, not
as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It is unnec-
essary in 20th century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they
have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
15. Id. at 449.
16. Id. at 460.
17. See, e.g., Marshall's dissent in Beal v. Roe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), which had upheld a law
that did not include nontherapeutic, medically unnecessary abortions within a Medicaid program: "I
am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach a 'right to life' that means [a) bare existence
in utter misery for so many poor women and their children." Id. at 456-57.
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its
impact. The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not
just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of
slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law.
And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has
not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made
it into the pot. 9
Marshall concluded:
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War our Government
started several 'affirmative action' programs. This Court in the Civil Rights Cases
and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward complete equality. For
almost a century no action was taken, and this nonaction was with the tacit
approval of the courts. Then we had Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil
Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous affirmative action programs.
Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative action
programs of the type [challenged in Bakke].20
Marshall's experience as a lawyer defending poor Afro-Ameri-
cans facing racial prejudice in the criminal justice system influenced
him to ultimately conclude that capital punishment is unconstitu-
tional. His practice taught him that juries can be wrong and that
their errors occurred with the greatest frequency when the defendant
was black. The irrevocable nature of the death penalty fails to ac-
count for juries' fallibility. 2' Marshall also decided that capital pun-
ishment was just plain wrong, and he vowed to fight its use to the
end. "I'll never give up," he said, echoing the determination he
showed decades earlier fighting against racial segregation: "On
something like that, you can't give up and you can't compromise.
It's so morally correct." 22
19. Id. at 400-01.
20. Id. at 402 (emphasis in original). Thirteen years later, Marshall's analogy of current Court
decisions to the Nineteenth Century Court's undercutting of post-Civil War legislation guaranteeing
civil rights in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), appears even more apropos in light of recent cases that have once again narrowly constricted
federal civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Ward's
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
21. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 346, 371 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring):
Death is irrevocable. Life imprisonment is not. Death, of course, makes rehabilitation
impossible. Life imprisonment does not. In short, death has always been viewed as the
ultimate sanction .... In striking down capital punishment, this court does not malign our
system of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it .... In recognizing the
humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute.
22. Ruth Marcus & Al Kamen, A Voice of Thunder Leaves the Court, WAsH. POST WEEKLY,
1991]
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Some of Marshall's opinions made substantial doctrinal contri-
butions toward protecting individual rights, although later cases have
taken some of the luster off his innovations. One of his early de-
cisions, Stanley v. Georgia,23 fused First Amendment and privacy
considerations to prohibit the government from punishing indivi-
duals for the mere possession in their homes of obscene materials.
"If the First Amendment means anything," Marshall wrote, "it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds."' '  Later, Police De-
partment of Chicago v. Mosely'5 articulated the Constitution's hos-
tility to differential treatment of speech based on its content. And
in several opinions dissenting or concurring, Marshall urged adop-
tion of his "sliding scale" analysis for applying the Equal Protection
Clause. He would gauge the level of judicial scrutiny according to
the nature of the classification used by the government and the im-
portance of the affected individual interest.2 6 Although no majority
ever formally subscribed to his analysis, it is actually more descrip-
tive of what the Court has, in fact, done than any formula set forth
in any majority opinion. In any event, Marshall's opinions persist-
ently and powerfully vented the positions, needs, and interests of
the oppressed, dispossessed, and the disenfranchised.
We will miss that voice, that conscience, speaking on the Court,
whether it be through his raucous tones from the bench during oral
July 1-7, 1991, at 6. Marshall wrote in his dissent to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 231 (1976),
that capital punishment is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishment." He repeatedly and without omission dissented from every case affirming a
death sentence or denying certiorari in a case in which death sentence had been imposed. E.g., Payne
v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Williams v. Arizona, 111 S.
Ct. 2043, 2043-44 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
23. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
24. Id. at 565.
25. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
26. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (concurring
opinion); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (dissenting opinion);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (dissenting opinion). Rather than
using a rigid two- or three-tiered scrutiny, as the Court purports to do, Marshall would take a more
flexible approach: The more important the individual interest at stake, and the more the affected
class resembles a suspect class, the greater is the burden on the government to justify its classification
and its refusal to use less discriminatory means. The result is a "sliding scale" of judicial review.
[Vol. 94
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argument or through his charged opinions in the U.S. Reports. But
at least we can express our appreciation for the persistence, candor,
and insight that he gave us for the past sixty years. We also can
hope that some among us will strive to emulate it.
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